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Abstract—It is important to be able to establish formal
performance bounds for autonomous systems. However, formal
verification techniques require a model of the environment in
which the system operates; a challenge for autonomous systems,
especially those expected to operate over longer timescales. This
paper describes work in progress to automate the monitor and
repair of ROS-based autonomous robot software written for an apriori partially known and possibly incorrect environment model.
A taint analysis method is used to automatically extract the dataflow sequence from input topic to publish topic, and instrument
that code. A unique reinforcement learning approximation of
MDP utility is calculated, an empirical and non-invasive
characterization of the inherent objectives of the software
designers. By comparing off-line (a-priori) utility with on-line
(deployed system) utility, we show, using a small but real ROS
example, that it’s possible to monitor a performance criterion and
relate violations of the criterion to parts of the software. The
software is then patched using automated software repair
techniques and evaluated against the original off-line utility.
Keywords— self-healing, autonomous system, performance
guarantee, automated repair, ROS, reinforcement learning

I. INTRODUCTION
As robot systems are increasingly deployed in domestic,
industrial and military applications, it is increasingly important
to develop a method to establish bounds for how systems will
perform under realistic operating conditions. While there is an
established engineering tradition of using mathematics to
model physical structures and processes sufficiently to
guarantee that a construction will fulfill its specification, there
are challenges applying this to autonomous systems [1]. Not
many software developers have the skill set necessary to
formally establish program correctness according to a
specification. But even if they did, formal verification of
software [2] [3] and autonomous systems [4], as well as ‘correct
by construction’ formal synthesis methods [5] all suffer from
the problem that they require a designer-specified model of the
environment. And that model can be incomplete because of
designer oversight or oversimplification of a complex and
dynamic environment. For autonomous systems that are
expected to operate over longer timescales, there is also the
issue of encountering significant drift over time between the
model and the environment encountered by the agent.
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Inspired by progress in empirical automated software repair
[6] we propose an approach to the automatic analysis and repair
of autonomous robot system software to handle environment
model related performance failures. Leveraging static analysis
techniques [7] used in compilers and security analysis, the
approach does not require software engineers to do more than
they are doing now in terms of coding. It aims to accomplish for
autonomous systems, what approaches like SapFix [8],
Clearview [9] and others [6] have achieved in automated
software patching.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section II
introduces the basic ideas in our approach. Section III uses a
short example to illustrate our non-invasive approach to analysis
and repair. Section IV summarizes the direction of the work and
the issues of scaling to future plans.
II. TARL APPROACH
The first assumption of our proposed approach is that while
most autonomous robot software is not developed using formal
verification techniques, nonetheless, software engineering
experience is such that the systems produced by experienced
software developers are a solid first approximation to a system
with formal performance guarantees. We will begin our
approach to formal performance guarantees by leveraging the
skills of software developers. This has the advantages of not
asking the software development community to adopt new
formalisms, and widening the scope of our method, at least in
principal, to include any existing (ROS) robot software.
Our second assumption is that experienced software
professionals are capable of writing a performance monitor that
will signal when their software is working as they intended it to
work (i.e., to their apprehension of the specification). The field
of runtime verification addresses this capability formally [10],
but our need is for far less; an informal monitor would suffice.
It is extremely common for the developers of autonomous
robot software to test their algorithms using a simulation tool
[11]. While is it true that simulation tools do not replace physical
testing, especially for uncertain environments, they nonetheless
have become very powerful and comprehensive – driven often
by the needs of realistic gaming applications. It is very likely
still true that “Simulation is doomed to succeed” [12] in the
sense that simulations only model what the designer expects to

happen (or v.v.). However, software designers’ use of
simulation opens for us an approach to non-invasive and
automatic formal characterization of working software, for at
least the conditions that the simulation implements. And we will
show that ultimately this will not be a restriction.
A. Formal Model
An autonomous robot system operating in a partially known
environment will be modeled as an MDP M(S, A, P, R) where
the state S is a function of sensor signals (we will augment this
presently), the actions A are the actuator commands, the
transition function P is the stochastic environment, and reward
R is the feedback on whether the system is satisfying its
performance specification. A policy  for M selects which
action to carry out based on the state. We will consider the
human-written system software to implicitly embody the policy
for M, and the human-written performance monitor to
implicitly embody the reward R.
The utility U(s) sS for an MDP is a measure of the long-term
desirability of each sS and can be written via a Bellman eq:
U(si) = R(si) +  j P(sj | si, (si)) U(sj)

(1)

for discount  and deterministic policy . We propose that
utility presents a non-invasive and automatic way to
characterize the performance of autonomous system software,
to indicate where the software may be lacking when the
performance monitor fails, and to automatically repair the
software. Reinforcement learning [13] gives us a way to
calculate utility, but only if the software can be automatically
instrumented for the calculation.
B. ROS
The ROS robot operating system is extremely widely used and
has greatly improved the portability of robot code since its
release in 2007. A ROS system is composed of computing
nodes that communicate over named channels called topics.
Sensor driver software publishes incoming measurements on
sensor topics. Other computing nodes can register callback
functions that will be triggered whenever data arrives on a
topic. Actuator drivers, that control the mechanism, register
callbacks that are triggered whenever data is written to actuator
topics. We will restrict our attention to ROS software both
because of its popularity and its convenient topic/node
structure. A ROS computation graph shows computation nodes
connected via the topics they communicate on. This makes it
very clear where data flows are coming in and going out.
C. Taint Analysis and Reinforcement Learning (TARL)
The performance monitor R, written by the human software
designers, tests all the input topics necessary to determine if the
performance guarantee holds. It is necessary to find an
automatic way to identify the connections, line by line through
computing node source code, between input topics and actuator
topic publishing commands. While some of this data flow is
evident in the ROS computation graph, most of it is hidden
within the source code. We will automatically find these data
flows and instrument them so that the utility can be estimated
in terms of sensor state and statement number. We will then

show how this information can be used to detect when software
is no longer performing correctly due to unanticipated aspects
of the environment, and to potentially repair it.
Taint analysis [7] is a static analysis technique employed in
compiler optimization and security analysis. The analysis starts
with a program and storage location to investigate for a
potential attack, the sink. Any user input location is a taint
source. The program is investigated to see what additional
storage locations become tainted in storing any computations
that involve a tainted location and whether this leads to the sink.
The sequence of statements between source and sink is the taint
list. We use PyT [14] (modified for ROS) to find taint lists in
ROS/Python code and instrument them for utility learning.
20 def callback(data): # collect position sensor
21 global pos
22 pos = data.pose.pose.position # from topic
23
24 def travel(goal,vout): # move to goal
25 global pos
26 err, delta, vel = 1, 0, 0
27 while err>Epsilon: # stop within Epsilon
28 delta = goal – pos
29 err = abs(delta)
30 vel = 5 * delta
31 vout.publish(vel) # write to topic
32
33 if __name__ == ‘__main__’:
34 try:
35 rospy.init_node('Traveller', anonymous=True)
36 rospy.Subscriber(Odometry,callback)
37 vpub=rospy.Publisher(Velocity,Twist,10)
38
while True: # go back and forth
39
travel(G1,vpub)
40
travel(G2,vpub)
41 except rospy.ROSInterruptException:
42
pass
Taint List:
(‘if __name__==’__main__’’, 33)
(‘data=Odometry’, 36)
(‘pos=data.pose.pose.position’,22)
(‘while True’, 38)
(‘delta=goal – pos’,27)
(‘vel=5*delta’,30)
(‘vout.publish(vel)’,31)
Figure 1: ROS/Python program implementing a recurrent robot task
(top); output of ROS-modified PyT taint analysis (bottom).

We use this as follows: Each taint list line is automatically
instrumented with a hook function that calls a reinforcement
learning (RL) algorithm. To calculate the utility (called value
in RL) we ask the software designers to repeatedly run the
software, once they consider it finished, using whatever
simulation they have been using. Whatever tradeoffs the
designers implicitly made in implementing the specification is
made explicit in this utility and will be our tool for
understanding the software and potentially repairing it. We
employ a SARSA TD-RL [13] algorithm to estimate utility in
terms of sensor state, taint-list line number and a reward-scaled

flow value. This last unique addition to the SARSA rule makes
utility sensitive not just to control-flow, but also to how the
information is being manipulated at each line.
III. EXAMPLE
Figure 1(top) shows python code for a ROS node that shuttles
a robot between two goal locations (e.g. delivery robot). The
performance monitor (not shown) is that the robot reaches each
goal within a time and precision bound. The taint list (Fig.
1(bottom)) tags the data flow in the program and is
instrumented for RL estimation of utility as described. For
convenience, the data below shows just the G1 to G2 transit.
A. Offline Utility
Let us consider that the robot has an odometry sensor and
velocity output, and also a binary terrain type sensor. This latter
is unused in Fig.1 as the designers consider the terrain won’t
affect the performance. Fig. 2 shows the utility calculated by
the SARSA algorithm converged for the performance
specification (reward) for the ‘off-line’ case, i.e., before the
software is deployed. The red points are the terrain sensor true
case, and blue are the false case. Line number are the left axis
and odometry the right. This graph is an empirical
characterization of the software designers’ intent, subject to
perhaps faulty information about the environment.

Figure 2: Utility table run under expected environment conditions

B. On-line Utility
Now let us consider what happens when our autonomous robot
system software is deployed, and it is found that the
environment does not behave as expected. It is found that
muddy terrain conditions are sometimes experienced in transit,
which slows down the progress of the robot towards its G2 goal.
Using the same RL framework, utility from real life missions is
collected; some missions experience the terrain issues and
(sometimes) fail and some experience the same environment
the designers expected. In this paper, to simplify the time
aspects of testing, we don’t run a physical robot mission. We
run another version of the off-line simulation in which the
environment model is changed.
Fig. 3 shows the utility collected during missions which
sometimes failed because of unexpected and unmodeled terrain
conditions. The horizontal axis is odometry and the colors are
as before. Looking at the difference of off-line and on-line
utilities we can isolate a region of maximum utility difference,
indicated in Fig 3 by the dashed rectangle. In that region we

calculate the average utility curves for the taint list on-line and
off-line cases and compare them
𝑞𝑠𝜋 (𝑛) =

∑

𝑞𝜋 (𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑛)

𝑚,𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓

(2)
Where n is line number, m is terrain sensor, p is odometry and
q is the utility.

Figure 3: Utility table under unexpected environment conditions

Figure 4(a) shows this comparison, which evidences a peak at
the 2nd last line (vel=5*delta). As it shows the maximum change
in utility, we propose this identifies it as the most likely culprit
for the failure and, hence, the candidate for repair analysis.

Figure 4: Comparison of off-line (blue) and on-line (yellow) utility
slices qs with difference (red) (a) original, (b) lines swapped.

It is reasonable to ask if the peak simply precedes the line
closest to the reward (the publish). To show that our addition of
flow information to the SARSA rule addresses this, the same
test was done but with Fig.1 lines 29 and 30 swapped. The result
is shown in Fig. 4(b) which now has a peak at the 3rd last line,
correctly reflecting the swap. The addition of the reward-scaled
flow value to the SARSA update equation is what makes utility
sensitive to the values being calculated.
C. Automated Repair
Automated program repair [6] is an area of increasing interest
to automate and speed up the patching of commercial software
bugs, especially security related bugs and for self-healing
autonomous devices. The process is typically divided into two
phases: determining where the bug might be located in the
software and proposing/testing fixes to the bug. Our approach
here will address the single line culprit model we developed in
the prior section. However, there is nothing that would limit this
being applied to a multiple line culprit model. We will also
continue to use RL as a solution method – this time to search

over the space of program modifications. Determining how to
edit the code will be divided into two steps:
1. Mutation of the affected code to generate potential
software patches
2. A modified -Greedy policy and SARSA TD-RL
algorithm to determine which mutation produces
optimal performance
We use the Python AST library to determine any constants in
the identified line and generate a set of mutated values for these
constants [8]. Every copy of the mutated instruction is protected
(i.e., within an IF statement) by the condition used to make the
value table slices, Eq. (2). Rather than testing one mutation at a
time, all mutations are tested by selecting among them with an
-Greedy policy and monitoring average total reward (ATR)
compared to that of the initial, off-line performance
ATR = t Rt / E

practical work done in automated software repair [8] to propose
an automated analysis and repair approach for existing software
for autonomous robot systems.
This paper describes work in progress, and the results presented
are from a thorough but small feasibility study. Our next steps
are to apply this to a large quadrotor mission in ROS-M. Issues
of scale need to be addressed in a mission with a multipart
performance guarantee resulting in multiple taint lists of
varying lengths being identified. By calculating one utility per
taint list and using the full multi-part performance monitor as
reward for every list, we propose to avoid the potential
exponential increase in utility size (2num_lists) while allowing for
performance related cross-effects between taint flows. The
example here uses a tabular utility. We expect however to need
topic-specific, parametric forms in future work.
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